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“The fire community is notorious for dealing better with things
than with people, for thinking with their hands, even as they
admit their core “challenges” are social and political.
Instead, they look for technological fixes where institutional reforms
may be more fundamental. In recent years, they have cranked out
a metric ton of high-quality studies on policy without
probing the fundamental political ecology of fire. They insist on
‘science-based’ solutions, even though the crux of most disputes
—the bottlenecks in moving plans into the field—
lies in a politics charged by disputes over ethics and esthetics.
They thus often treat public opinion as though it were
an overgrown woods, needing only a suitable prescription
for silvi-social thinning in order for an agreement to emerge,
a problem that can be ‘solved’ by proper ‘social science’ research.
This mind-set only prolongs the agony.”
Stephen J. Pyne, Ph.D., 2003
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INTRODUCTION

After the historic 2000 fire season, the Andrus Center for Public Policy
and the Idaho Statesman convened a conference, The Fires Next Time, which
brought together fire experts, state and local officials, the insurance industry,
timber executives, and environmentalists. We wanted answers to the vexing
dilemma: how to change policy to begin to prevent these almost annual
catastrophic fires.
Those discussions brought a remarkable degree of consensus. Everyone
agreed that we must shift from a federal policy that reacts to fire to one that
adopts proactive measures to reduce fire threats to western communities.
Three years later, it is painfully obvious that progress on change has been
glacially slow.
In 2003, it was California’s turn to suffer through an unusually
devastating fire season. In 12 days, 22 people were killed, 183 firefighters
were injured, 3,500 homes were
lost, and more than 740,000
Both funding shortfall and political disagreements have
acres of forest and brush lands
slowed the pace of meaningful efforts to thin, log, and
were consumed. In the rest of
burn western forests.
the West, the 2002 fire season
was nearly as fierce as the 2000
season. All of these fires confirm the reality addressed in The Fires Next Time:
The West faces huge fires and huge consequences for decades unless it can
learn how to manage fire and people.
Both funding shortfall and political disagreements have slowed the pace
of meaningful efforts to thin, log, and burn western forests. Budget shortfalls
are likely to continue to hamper fire policy reform efforts although money
is not the major issue. The Bush Administration’s effort to curb the agencies’
blank check is a good first step, but it needs a detailed plan for reform that
will probably cost at least as much as the current system. Congress approved
President Bush’s “Healthy Forests Initiative,” which would direct $762 million
in federal funds to thinning projects. The law, which sends 50% of the money
to areas near communities, moves the debate back toward the consensus of
2000, but it still falls short of the full-scale return that is necessary to address
this challenge.
First, coordination and cooperation among federal agencies must
improve, and natural bureaucratic aversion to change must be overcome.
Next, completing fire management plans that allow managers to make good
decisions about what fires to fight aggressively and what fires to monitor must
become a high priority in all the agencies. Third, funding must be prioritized
and sent to the region where the problem exists, the West, instead of being
politically divided nationwide. Finally, local government and individual
homeowners must take more responsibility to protect themselves.
The best that can be said regarding this pace of policy change is that
the same old political disagreements will serve to narrow the scope of where
thinning and logging activities will take place. Environmentalists, forest
agencies, local officials, the timber industry, and others may well be able to
agree on some fire prevention projects, but the agreements will be project
by project, for the most part. We simply must do more. We must display the
political and management will to force additional progress—and we must do
it quickly. The new forest health legislation will test this will.
Our fire fighters do good and noble work, and they deserve our thanks.
Many are also receiving hazard pay, which they clearly deserve, but the extra
dollars in the pay envelope help explain some of their eagerness to stay on
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fire duty. Meanwhile, important other work in the forest, including basic
decision- making, slows down dramatically during the summer fire season.
Many of the delays in proactive thinning and fire prevention programs are a
result of the fact that project planners are off fighting fires.
Unless Congress is prepared to increase substantially the size of the Forest
Service and to separate fire suppression efforts from the forest restoration
programs, this will be a continuing problem. Taking those two steps would be
one way to reduce the gridlock. Still, at the root of all questions about fire, we
find profound disagreement over the purposes of the national forests and over
the methods of forest management.
In a number of areas, including Idaho, discussions have begun over the
issue of small wood. There does seem to be agreement that getting smallerdiameter wood off the forests makes sense, helps prevent catastrophic fires,
addresses forest health issues, and supports local economies. More needs to be
done in developing markets that can utilize the small-diameter wood. This is
a project that both environmentalists and industry should be able to embrace.
Policy makers could mandate the use of rustic log fencing on public forest
roads or wood erosion stabilizers for use in burned-out gullies. Increasing use
of this type of wood fiber could be made in particle board manufacturing, in
log homes, and in power generation.
Perhaps the most important way to move policy change along is to
concentrate on areas of agreement: Concentrate immediate efforts close to
communities at risk in order that trust can be built. Encourage private property
owners to aggressively protect their own homes. Detail Smokey the Bear—the
Forest Service’s most effective spokesman—to work telling homeowners,
“Only you can protect your home from wildfire.”
Finally, leaders of the environmental community, the timber industry,
unions, and local governments need to acknowledge that the forest wars of the
last century are over. The Bush Administration could encourage this dialogue
with an honest assessment: Industrial forestry on national forests is largely a thing
of the past. Today, restoration, forest health, and fire prevention are the jobs of the
U. S. Forest Service, and all the parties must get on board.
Westerners are in the midst of a crisis that demands a willingness to
take risks, show leadership, and act immediately. If we don’t get on with the
change in policy, the priceless forests we all love will be lost for generations,
and the cost to people and property will continue to be frightful.
•••
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In December of 2000, the Andrus Center for Public Policy convened
a conference that sought to examine the history, science, and policy of fire
management. The severity of the 2000 fire season was the inspiration for
the conference. The Chief of the U. S. Forest Service, Dale Bosworth, later
noted that the conference helped begin a conversation that would lead to the
development of a comprehensive strategy to address the growing risks from
wildland fires. The Andrus Center issued a white paper on the conference,
one that presented a number of findings based on what was said and promised
that day.
After three fire seasons and a change in presidential administration,
it’s time to revisit those findings to see what has happened since then.
In several cases, our original findings have been combined to reflect events
more accurately events that have occurred since the conference.
FINDING NO. 1: We need to rethink our beliefs and myths about fire.
In many cases, fire belongs on the western landscape. Fire is often not as
bad as we have historically thought it to be.

It keeps being said, but it hasn’t happened yet. There is a role for fire,
but it seems likely that what are perceived as “catastrophic” fires in the media
makes that message hard to hear. During the 2002 fire season, for example,
governors, such as Jane Hull of Arizona, called for more fire fighters.
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To Steven J. Pyne, our conference
keynoter, the problem remains much
“Unless someone begins the task of re-centering fire
as it did three years ago. As he recently
and fire management within the larger culture,
noted, “Unless someone begins
all its research will either become the political
the task of re-centering fire and fire
equivalent
of money-laundering or be frittered
management within the larger culture,
away in a frenzy of hot-spotting.”
all its research will either become
the political equivalent of moneySteven J. Pyne, Ph.D.
laundering or be frittered away in a
frenzy of hot-spotting.” (Pyne, 2003)
It is also clear that fire is but one tool to be used by managers as they
attempt to implement the forest health legislation. What is more, it cannot
be used everywhere. Some forests, for example, are not suitable for fuel
treatments designed to alter fire behavior.
FINDING NO. 2: The conflict between prescribed burning and air quality
regulations must be reconciled.

As noted by National Wildfire Coordinating Group in its Fire
Effects Guide:
The effects of smoke on health, air quality, and regional haze is
very important to all land managers. They must recognize the need
to manage smoke from wildland fires, using the Best Available
Control Measures. Every manager must determine the level of smoke
management necessary to provide the least impact on the public, both
in terms of health and visibility. The effects of smoke on firefighters also
must be considered when managing wildland fires. If federal agencies
do not take a rational, voluntary approach to smoke management, a
mandatory approach may
be provided that makes
Prescribed burning and clean air represent two public
it more difficult to meet
goods seemingly at odds with each other.
resource management goals
and objectives. (92)
Prescribed burning and clean air represent two public goods seemingly
at odds with each other. It is likely that optimum prescribed fire activities
will be constrained by public health and visibility goals of the Clean Air
Act. At this point, it seems that federal land managers may have been more
responsive to air quality concerns than their counterparts have been to the
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role of prescribed fire. This could be considered ironic from the perspective of
two hundred years ago when smoke was likely to be encountered throughout
the fire season. At the same time, with rising concerns over the global warming
issue, fire in the west does need clear justification by the humans in charge of
its management.
FINDINGS NO. 3 AND 5: One-time increases in fire monies will be
insufficient to solve the problem and may set the federal land management
agencies up for failure. A ten to fifteen-year plan with appropriate
accountability and funding mechanisms is needed. Consideration should
be given to establishing a revolving fire fund for a minimum of 15 years.

Fire suppression and rehabilitation funds need to be closely monitored
and spent more wisely.
There are several issues here. The first concerns long-term funding.
Congress has not established a revolving fund but has continued its support
of fire-related funding. According to the Congressional Research Service,
President Bush’s budget requests have continued along the lines of the effort
begun in 2000 under President Clinton. Congress has supported and added a
bit to those requests.
The question of fire suppression funding is more complex and charged.
For a time, the Bush Administration proposed not restoring all the funds that
had been borrowed from other spending accounts for suppression activities
during the 2002 fire season. This action by the Administration had the effect
of paralleling the arguments of those, such as Randall O’Toole of the Thoreau
Institute, who are saying that reimbursement essentially gave a “blank check”
to agencies and thus an incentive to suppress fires. Although most of the
money has been restored, O’Toole’s arguments have some merit. Last year, the
Forest Service applauded Clearwater and Nez Perce National Forest supervisors
Larry Dawson and Bruce Bernhardt for their ambitious use of fire during a
relatively active fire season. The two allowed natural fires to treat thousands of
acres of land that would have otherwise had to have been artificially thinned
or burned at a far higher cost.
FINDING NO. 6: Support for locally-based, collaborative solutions is strong,
but these concepts need more definition and development.

Unfortunately, collaboration appeared compromised for a while by
national political strategy and the President’s “Healthy Forests Initiative.”
So, too, has the lack of success of so-called Stewardship Initiatives, such as
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the Meadow Face project on the Nez Perce National Forest. There, loggers,
sportsmen, Native Americans, and environmentalists forged an agreement
that allowed extensive logging,
restoration, and road-closures. The
With the passage of a compromise forest health
Forest Service was unable to make the
bill, however, perhaps collaborative efforts will have
funding work, and the consensus fell
more promise in the future.
apart. Consensus has held together,
however, for thinning projects
around Idaho City on the Boise National Forest. Locally-based consensus
efforts remain an important part of an overall strategy. But ultimately, the
federal agencies, states, and local governments will remain accountable for
the success of wildfire policy reform. With the passage of a compromise forest
health bill, however, perhaps collaborative efforts will have more promise in
the future.
FINDING NO. 7: Fire policy decisions will be constrained by disagreement
over the direction of forest and range policy. Decision-making methods need
to be sufficiently broadly based to eliminate the need for litigation.
FINDING NO. 8: There is strong disagreement over the appropriate mix
of prescribed fire, thinning, and logging as management tools. There
is consensus, however, that fuel reduction should begin near at-risk
communities and work outward.

Disagreement remains as illustrated by the debate over the Forest Health
bill passed by Congress. The compromise legislation targets about half the
new monies on fuel reduction in the wildland urban zone, our “consensus
lands,” as discussed in the white paper.
We remain convinced that the consensus
“The future of wildland fire depends
is still there. Larger debates and ideologies,
on the future of wildlands.”
however, make is difficult to move on that
Steven J. Pyne, Ph.D.
consensus. It should not surprise anyone any
longer that people will use science to support
pre-determined agendas. But we remain convinced that what we said earlier
is true: The political consensus is to start in the interface first. There is at this
point no definitive scientific evidence that would override that consensus.
Stephen Pyne has pointed out that what remains in conflict is what he
terms “the land between.” As he puts it:
“The future of wildland fire depends on the future of wildlands. But
between the intermix landscape and those places legally reserved as
wilderness or parks lies an unsettled public domain. Some reasonable
agreement exists about what to do with fire at the poles of the urban
and the wild; there is little regarding the land between them. Yet that is
where the worst fires are flourishing, where the contest over thinning
and burning is fiercest, and where the nation remains most irresolute.
It is where the imperial narrative is now playing out. The Land Between
will probably replace the intermix fire as fire’s next new thing.
Because Americans cannot agree on what those lands should be, they
cannot craft a consensual strategy for managing fire on them.”
The new forest health legislation will test our ability to come to that
consensual strategy on these lands.
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There is also recent indication that some western leaders have returned
to the original consensus we saw at the 2000 conference. The governors of
New Mexico and Arizona, Bill Richardson and Janet Napolitano, have argued
that more attention needs to
be paid to at-risk communities.
Ever since the first cavalrymen used buckets and shovels
They have said that at least
to fight fire in Yellowstone in 1886, fire control has
70% of proposed “forest health”
been the foundation of land management.
projects should be in areas
around communities and that
the Forest Service should be prohibited from borrowing from other accounts
to fund fire-fighting efforts. These are Democratic state officials talking, and
thus the argument that those closer to the ground have a better sense of what
should be done will be tested here.
FINDING NO. 9: Wildfire policy solutions need to be linked to other land
management policies and laws where possible.

Forests and range lands are managed for a wide variety of values, and
those values have shifted dramatically in the last 30 years. Industrial forestry
is no longer the dominant use on national forests. Cattle-grazing, while still
an important use on federal range lands, is losing its dominance to recreation
and perhaps energy development. Fire policy has far too often, in the history
of public lands management, been an end unto itself. Ever since the first
cavalrymen used buckets and shovels to fight fire in Yellowstone in 1886, fire
control has been the foundation of land management. Part of the solution is
loosening the control over fire and increasing the emphasis on shifting land
use to fit within the limits of the land, fires, floods, and droughts.
•••
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